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Efforts to control internal conflicts in the common interest of
stability and peace do not suffer from the absence of a juridical
basis for internationalization. The United Nations system provides
a basis under the "threat to the peace" formulation; moreover, the
recent extension of humanitarian law to internal conflicts by the
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts is a specific step in the direction of internationalization. Control efforts, however, generate a
host of dilemmas because of the international system's central emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention.
The special deference to the territorial sovereign under traditional international law tends to inhibit the development of a regime which contemplates external control of internal conflicts.
States simply do not wish or have the will to develop a meaningful
regime at the expense of sovereign perogatives. Nevertheless, the
centrality of sovereignty and non-intervention under traditional international law has not inhibited revolutionary approaches which
either condone involvement in, or recognize the right to foment,
internal conflicts under such covers as national liberation and anticolonialism. The need of the international system to cope with this
ambivalence in the status quo presents a fundamental dilemma.
The Soviet approach to contemporary international law, the Law
of Peaceful Coexistence, is a prime example of the claimed legal
right to intervene on behalf of progressive (i.e., socialist-oriented)
forces in an internal conflict. This approach is possible because of
the special (i.e., subjectively socialist) Soviet interpretation of such
traditional international legal principles as sovereignty and nonintervention, and the Soviet attitude towards responsibilities to international and regional organizations. As a complement to the
Law of Peaceful Coexistence, the Brezhnev Doctrine assures that
pro-socialist forces remain in power by recognizing the right and
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duty of socialist states to intervene in internal conflicts to protect
socialist interests. The existence of a socialist-oriented system to
support revolutionary struggles and favorable regimes contributes
to the destabilizing nature of internal conflicts because more of
them tend to engage the interests of the superpowers and, therefore, become objects of East-West rivalry.
Although the Soviet approach to the internationalization of internal conflicts is based on the recognition that internal conflicts
must be controlled in the interest of international order, albeit socialist order, it is not a positive development. Actually, it complicates the process of gaining acceptance of a universal order system
because it constitutes the principal political hurdle to its acceptance. The Soviet "lead" in this area has tended to place a heavy
political burden on the internationalization issue because it is already a part of the competitive East-West relationship. It is difficult to imagine that the socialist states and their neutralist supporters would embrace a less biased approach to the control of
internal conflicts.
There are other discouraging aspects of regime building in this
area. The question of standards for the control action contemplated, whether organizational or by individual states, is a difficult
one. Although differences may be papered over in reaching formal
agreement on the text of an international legal standard, experience shows that interpretation and state action based thereon tend
to be very political matters. It is difficult to structure any legal
regime based on the ad hoc consent of states that would not become politicized because of their tendency to react to international
standards by making legal characterizations in conformity with the
perceived national political interest or need.
As to the actor in the control process, the choice is not an easy
one. The United Nations system has not been particularly successful in its efforts to control international conflicts in the common
interest. The Falkland Islands episode is the most recent example
of the United Nations inability to control a situation, even where
the interests of the superpowers were not directly engaged. Nor
have regional organizations enjoyed notably greater success. The
basic positivistic orientation of the international system, which
makes ultimate organizational action dependent upon the consent
of member states on an ad hoc basis, has inhibited meaningful action and does not portend well for a possible international organizational role in the control of internal conflicts. The alternative of
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action by individual states is subject to too many possibilities of

abuse to be considered feasible.
In summary, the international community is faced with the
problem of coping with the current unsatisfactory situation with
respect to internal conflicts. Coping requires states' acceptance of a
new approach to international order which departs from traditional and "revolutionary" positions. At the very least, states must
be prepared to qualify current concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention in the community interest; and the Soviet Union (as
well as other states) must be prepared to discard that part of its
approach to contemporary international law which supports internal conflicts which it chooses to characterize as revolutionary. The
problem is that states can be expected to follow the usual pattern
of resisting constraints on their freedom of action on political
grounds. Although the experience of the United Nations and regional organizations in attempting to control international conflicts
has not been very encouraging, it can be hoped that the time will
come when the common interest in controlling destabilizing internal conflicts will be strong enough to permit the development of
regimes involving a meaningful role for international and regional
organizations.
The Workshop, "Internal Conflicts: Dilemmas in International
Law," held at the University of Georgia, May 7-8, 1982, looked at
the problem of controlling destabilizing internal conflicts in the
light of all the dilemmas generated thereby. The thrust was to look
at extant law and the desired direction of future legal development. While the extension of international control over the humanitarian aspects of internal conflicts was considered an important symbolic recognition of the need for "community action," it
was generally felt that it does not portend a readiness to extend
that action to neutralization or attenuation of the threat potential
of internal conflicts. Nevertheless, it was agreed that an effort at
international control is indicated as recent history confirms that, in
the present increasingly competitive and uncertain international
environment, internal conflicts can be as destabilizing as international conflicts.
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